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Happiness – a primer for theological engagement




This essay discerns themes in the interdisciplinary study of happiness. We distinguish 
between the concepts of hedonic and eudaimonic happiness, as well as the concepts 
of well-being and quality of life. We also discuss the role of some determinants of 
happiness (income, relationships, life phase, geography and religion). We conclude 
by suggesting points of contact (the flourishing agent, determinants of happiness, 
anamnesis and eschatology, and the quest for meaning) where theological engagement 
can significantly clarify and enrich the happiness discourse. 
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Introduction
In recent decades, the theme of happiness has expanded its reach beyond 
the usual discussion in philosophy, literature and art to an ever-increasing 
range of scientific disciplines. Happiness (and co-terms like “well-being” 
and “life satisfaction”) became the object of research in disciplines as 
diverse as economics (the “Economics of Happiness” is now a recognized 
sub-discipline), psychology (with “positive psychology” the main school 
of thought), sociology, neurology and interdisciplinary hybrid sciences 
like neuropsychology and social economics. Institutions like the Erasmus 
Happiness Economics Research Organisation and the dedicated Journal 
of Happiness Studies also positively contributed to this assessment of the 
state of knowledge on the subject of happiness. With the development of 
interdisciplinary discourses on happiness, controversy also intensified on 
what really constitutes this seemingly elusive state of mind. Is it a sensual 
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experience, an emotion (like contentment, optimism or euphoria), is it hope 
or meaning, is it a state of mind or a set of values and an ethical disposition? 
In this essay we discern trends in this field of “happiness science”, with a 
particular focus on sources from experimental psychology as published in 
journals like the Journal of Happiness Studies, and find points of contact 
for theological contribution to this discourse. 
The study of happiness
The hedonic and eudaimonic schools
Research on happiness originates in two philosophical schools of thought 
going back to the Greek philosophers, commonly referred to as the 
hedonic and eudaimonistic schools. The hedonic school is based upon 
the presumption that the chief goal of life is to seek pleasure and to avoid 
pain. Hedonism sees happiness as the experience of pleasure, including 
the pleasurable experience associated with positive cognitive assessment 
of life circumstances. “Subjective well-being” is a widely applied concept 
and measurement, which stems from the hedonic view. Caunt et al (2013, 
p. 476) quote Diener on subjective well-being: “People experience abundant 
subjective well-being when they feel many pleasant and few unpleasant 
emotions, when they are engaged in interesting activities, when they 
experience many pleasures and few pains, and when they are satisfied 
with their lives.” As such subjective well-being has a cognitive element of 
satisfaction or contentment with your life, as well as the affective element 
of more frequent positive than negative affect. 
Whereas hedonism can be described as the view that well-being consists 
of maximum pleasure and minimum pain, eudaimonism is about the idea 
that well-being lies in the actualization of human potentials. People have 
final values and purposes, which they will pursue and try to fulfil beyond 
mere pleasure and pain criteria. Therefore this (Aristotelian) view states 
that “happiness forms part of a virtuous or ethical understanding of life. 
Eudaimonism conveys the belief that well-being consists of fulfilling or 
realizing one’s daemon or true nature” (Wills, 2009, p. 55). 
Eudaimonic happiness goes beyond the subjective experience of hedonistic 
happiness and is a more normative approach utilizing external criteria for 
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evaluating well-being, including the possession and practice of certain 
virtues (like compassion, self-sacrifice and authenticity). Therefore 
“psychological” well-being, in distinction from “subjective” well-being, 
“includes environmental mastery, a sense of purpose in life and positive 
relations with others” (Caunt, et al., 2013, p. 476). 
Pleasure and good feelings are not necessarily to be seen as negative 
in virtue ethics (the eudaimonic school) (Joshanloo, 2013, p. 1860). 
Pleasurable feelings are just too temporary to be held as central to well-
being. Pleasure can (and often does) accompany a eudaimonic life (in other 
words, subjective well-being can be the by-product of psychological well-
being), but those pleasures are more (as Aristotle would describe them) 
“noble pleasures” (like learning) than “base pleasures” (like gluttony). The 
measure of the nobleness of pleasure is the extent of consistency with the 
human “telos” (goal or deeper meaning of human life). As such eudaimonic 
happiness is more a process of human growth (to be seen as “flourishing” 
or self-actualization) than a destination point, which is inherently unstable 
in any case (the momentary pleasure of the satisfaction of “lower” needs 
and desires).
Raibley investigated the link between episodic happiness (usually identified 
with the hedonic school) and “happiness in the personal attribute sense” 
(also known as well-being and identified with the eudaimonic school) 
(Raibley, 2012, p. 1106). When we are saying someone “is happy” we may 
indeed be referring to the fact that such a person is in high spirits, a good 
mood, feeling good, and is probably smiling. These emotional states are 
highly responsive to external circumstances and are therefore decidedly 
short-lived and notoriously unstable. Emotional states is distinct from 
values, temperaments and personality or character traits, which suggests 
a sort of “set-point” of happiness to which individuals tend to return as 
default positions. Happiness in the personal attribute sense refers more 
to an individual’s disposition, therefore whether an individual is prone to 
seek the positive and to be on a constant quest for meaning and purpose, 
thereby engaging positively with his or her environment. The more 
persistent, pervasive and profound this disposition is, the “happier” one 
is (Raibley, 2012, p. 1109). This type of happiness can indeed be aligned 
with emotional responses, being either a very active emotional state (a 
very agile engagement with the environment) or very tranquil and calm (a 
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low activity state of peacefulness). Both states, however, stand in contrast 
to anxiety (high active negative disposition) and depression (low active 
negative disposition). 
Raibly argues for the proper relationship between both episodic happiness 
and happiness in the personal attribute sense to subjective well-being. 
There is clearly a strong correlation, to the extent that a higher frequency of 
episodic happiness over a longer period of time can be symptomatic of trait 
happiness. Raibly eventually opts for the term “well-being” as overarching 
term including both episodic and trait happiness. He defines this “well-
being” as agential flourishing:
“The paradigm case of the flourishing agent is a person who suc-
cessfully realizes their values and is stably disposed to do so. This 
person must have values, must desire to realize these values, and 
must possess a body and mind that are suitable for efficacious action 
on behalf of these values. Furthermore, this person must actual-
ly pursue and realize these values through their own effort – and 
experience appropriate emotional feedback on this entire process. 
The paradigmatically flourishing agent’s valuational and motivatio-
nal systems function fruitfully and harmoniously” (Raibley, 2012, p. 
1116). 
The “flourishing agent” is Raibley’s suggestion of a shared space where well-
being can relate to both hedonic and eudaimonic happiness. His definition 
suggests stable values (in the sense of a long-term and predictable preference 
for certain things, attitudes or activities) and actual engagement (an active 
quest for or pursuing of the realisation of these values). Flourishing in this 
sense then also includes certain “habits of the mind”, like self-awareness 
and rationality (Raibley, 2012, p. 1117). Of course, one would also need 
the capacities (physically and mentally) to pursue the realisation of these 
values. The psychological capacities needed include a stance of engagement, 
self-acceptance, a sense of self-determination, positive relations with 
others, a sense of purpose and openness to personal growth and change 
(Raibley, 2012, p. 1118). The clear connection to emotional states (feeling 
upbeat, motivated, et cetera) indicates how intertwined well-being is with 
both episodic and personal trait happiness. On the other hand, episodic 
and personal trait happiness does not necessarily lead to and coincide 
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with well-being in the above-defined sense of flourishing as it does not 
necessarily include either the value-component or the capacities to realise 
value-based goal-setting. 
Subjective well-being and quality of life
Raibley’s notion of “the flourishing agent” endeavours an embrace of both 
hedonic (episodic) happiness and eudaimonic (trait) happiness under a 
unified theory. Expanded theories of subjective well-being and quality of 
life attempt the same and will be discussed in this section. 
Subjective well-being
Jovanovic (2011, p. 631) notes that confusion exists in the use of the 
term “subjective well-being”, because both a cognitive and an affective 
component are usually included in the construct, so that subjective well-
being can have as components “satisfaction with life, positive affect and a 
low level of negative affect. Satisfaction with life represents the cognitive 
aspect of subjective well-being and it refers to global evaluation of a person 
on how his/her life looks like. Positive affect implies frequent experiences of 
pleasant emotions and low level of negative affect implies a relative absence 
of unpleasant emotional states” (Jovanovic, 2011, p. 631). Their empirical 
study tests the influence of personality traits (the five factors of activity, 
sociability, aggression, impulsivity, and anxiety) on the cognitive and 
affective aspects of subjective well-being, respectively. What they found, 
after establishing that subjective well-being indeed consists of affective 
well-being and cognitive well-being, is that the personality traits influence 
the affective well-being, but not so much the cognitive well-being of an 
individual. 
Angner (2010, p. 362) argues for a distinction between well-being simpliciter 
and subjective well-being. Well-being simpliciter is “what we have when our 
lives are going well for us, when we are living lives that are not necessarily 
morally good, but good for us,” which he then calls the core of well-being. 
The focus is on a non-moral utility or flourishing. Angner (2010, pp. 362-
364) discusses the different views on well-being found in the literature: 
“mental-state” views see well-being as having an experiential component, 
“desire-fulfilment” (or preference-satisfaction) views focus on the extent 
to which desires and preferences are met as an indication of well-being, 
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and “objective” views attempt to eliminate any dependence on experience, 
and only look at objective conditions which are seen to be good or bad for 
human beings, irrespective of what feelings the condition bring to the fore. 
Angner subsequently proposes his own taxonomy of subjective well-being 
under cognitive, affective or composite views. Subjective well-being can 
consist of a cognitive evaluation of one’s life as a whole (it can also refer to 
certain attitudes). The affective view can refer to a hedonistic perspective 
where (maximum) pleasure and (minimal) pain are assessed or as mood or 
emotions. Composite views see subjective well-being as a state where the 
constituents can be a combination of cognitive and affective determinants. 
In his appropriation of the term preference hedonism Angner (2010, p. 
366) links the emphasis on pain and pleasure with individual desire. When 
there is a fit between desire and the corresponding pains and pleasures, 
subjective well-being will be present. 
In his attempt to develop a unified theory of subjective well-being 
Durayappah (2010, pp. 682-684) provides a fairly comprehensive overview 
of current theories and models of subjective well-being. 
1. In the “Liking, Wanting, Needing” model, subjective well-being 
are determined by three perspectives. The first determinant would 
be “Liking”, that is the classical “hedonic” perspective, namely 
maximising current experience of pleasure and minimizing current 
experience of pain. The second determinant would be “Needing”, 
which focuses on the fulfilment of basic needs (for example as defined 
by the Maslow hierarchy). Fulfilled needs increase happiness and 
unfulfilled needs constrain the increase of happiness. The third 
determinant is “Wanting”, which defines subjective well-being or 
happiness more in terms of a quest or journey, than a destination or 
result. Here, “subjective wellbeing is determined by the pursuit of 
desires or goals” (Durayappah, 2010, p. 682). Durayappah cites the 
1994 research of Davidson showing that pleasure gained over the 
longer term while working towards a chosen goal is more than the 
short-lived feeling of contentment when reaching the goal. 
2. In the “Multiple Discrepancy Theory” the result of different 
comparisons supposedly increases or decreases happiness and 
subjective well-being (upward comparison decreases satisfaction, as 
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the reality is worse than the expectation, and downward comparison 
increases satisfaction, as the reality is better than the expectation). 
Comparative standards may for example be against other people, past 
experiences, ideal levels of satisfaction (subjectively defined), and level 
of progress towards set goals. 
3. A third theory distinguishes between “top-down” and “bottom-
up” determinants, respectively signifying subjective and objective 
determinants. In the top-down approach, the emphasis is on an 
individual’s subjective interpretation of events (attitude toward 
objective events) or an individual’s values and goals, which inspire 
certain habits, which lead to more subjective well-being. The 
bottom-up approach emphasises the role of objective circumstances 
(age, marital status, income, education, et cetera) influencing an 
individual’s subjective well-being. 
4. The fourth theory is the “Orientations to Happiness” model. Seligman 
is a specific proponent of this theory, which is applied in research 
such as that of Peterson, Park and Seligman (2005). The three roads to 
happiness are defined here as the pleasant life (the hedonistic focus on 
positive emotions and pleasure), the engaged life and the meaningful 
life (the more eudaimonistic focus). 
5. Finally Durayappah (2010, p. 684) also introduces Keyes’ Mental 
Health Continuum, typifying high levels of psychological and social 
well-being as “flourishing” and low levels as “languishing”. 
Durayappah subsequently proposes his own “3P” model, which stands 
for Present, Past, and Prospect (future) as the temporal determinants 
of subjective well-being. The present relates to positive emotions, which 
have a consuming effect (being lost in the moment, not contemplating 
past and future). Measurement of subjective well-being’s component 
of the “present” will focus on “experience”. The past relates to a positive 
reminiscing, often accompanied by gratitude and ascribing meaning to 
past events and experiences. Measurement will focus on the individual’s 
subjective evaluation of his or her past. The future relates to optimism or 
positive anticipation and the experience of purpose moving towards the 
future. Measurement will focus on the individual’s sense of expectation. 
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Durayappah identifies “biases” when the different temporal determinants 
interact. These biases function as filters when influencing the individual’s 
subjective well-being. The “duration neglect” bias, for example, describes 
the tendency to evaluate a past event of any duration, according to how 
it ends (in other words, its present state). The “impact bias”, on the other 
hand, filters between past and future in that we overestimate the impact of 
past events on our future well-being, as well as overestimate the emotional 
impact of future events. Between future and present another bias also 
exists, namely the comparison of what could’ve been, or different outcomes 
envisioned and previously aspired to. The error in prediction or discrepancy 
between expected and real outcome filters the individual’s assessment of 
subjective well-being. Finally Durayappah also gives credence to research 
suggesting that individuals may have a certain “set-point” of subjective 
well-being (among other factors influenced by personality) to which they 
keep returning as a kind of default position after adapting to positive or 
negative events in their environment (more on the set-point of happiness 
later in this essay). This would constitute a meta-bias having a generalized 
impact on an individual’s subjective well-being levels. 
Although certain types of individuals can be identified according to their 
primary preference for past (the “Documenter”), present (the “Doer) or 
prospect (the “Dreamer”),1 Durayappah suggests that his 3P model should 
be seen as a cyclical model where the three temporal modes interact as 
an individual continuously assesses his or her subjective well-being. Life 
stages theory does suggest that there may also be “shifts in temporal 
attention” (Durayappah, 2010, p. 703) during human developmental phases 
(childhood focus is on present experience, young adults’ focus is on future 
purpose and mature adulthood on finding coherent meaning in one’s life 
story). 
Durayappah’s model suggests that reliving the past (reminiscing and 
reframing), and pre-experiencing the future (anticipation of the good) 
may lead to an increase in subjective well-being, as well as counter-
1 “The Dreamer finds the most happiness as he expects and plans for an event, hopes 
for an event, and/or anticipates an event. The Doer finds the most happiness in the 
feeling of the experience and in being in the moment. Finally, the Documenter gains 
the most happiness when processing the experience and understanding its meaning” 
(Durayappah, 2010, p. 697).
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acting the biases which decreases subjective well-being. In the end, the 
integration of temporal modes around a eudaimonic view of happiness 
is what Durayappah would call the “great life”. Purpose (prospect), self-
determination (present) and meaning (past) interact to create sustainable 
subjective well-being, beyond the mere set-point happiness level of an 
individual. The latter more or less corresponds with the hedonic view of 
happiness, where present, past and future are directed towards positive 
emotional and sensual stimuli, which by definition is short-lived and “less 
rewarding because of their instability” (Durayappah, 2010, p. 707).
Quality of life
In his attempt to create order out of the interdisciplinary terminological 
chaos and the corresponding confusion over measuring instruments 
and criteria, Veenhoven (2000) suggests a two by two matrix providing 
taxonomy for different terms and measures. Concepts like quality of life 
(used especially in the medical sphere), well-being (psychology), welfare 
(sociology), wealth and development (economics) and blessing (theology) 
are sometimes used interchangeably in interdisciplinary discourse, with 
“happiness” as a “catch-all” umbrella term denoting the general field of 
human flourishing. Like Zapf before him2, Veenhoven recognizes the 
difference between outer (objective) and inner (subjective) qualities, but 
adds the distinction between life-chances (opportunities) and life-results 
(outcomes). The possible discrepancies here (for example making the most 
of adverse conditions, or not utilising profitable conditions) determine 
eventual quality of life, and therefore needs to be taken into account in the 
definition of terms. Veenhoven then describes the outer and inner types of 
life chances, namely the “liveability” of the environment (also known as 
social capital) and the “life-ability” of the individual (the personal capacities 
also known as psychological capital). Veenhoven then gives credence to the 
notion that “a good life must be good for something more than itself” – that 
is “be useful” (Veenhoven, 2000, p. 7). He uses the easily misinterpreted 
2 He finds the fourfold classification of Zapf (Veenhoven, 2000, p. 4) “elegant” but not 
particularly useful. Zapf distinguished between objective measures of life conditions 
(for example health) and subjective appreciation of life. When both are positive, he 
speaks of “well-being”, when both are negative, of “deprivation”. When objective 
measures are positive but subjective appreciation negative, there is “dissonance” and the 
combination of negative objective measures, but positive appreciation is “adaptation” 
(although it could also be denial or resignation). 
300 Van der Merwe  •  STJ 2015, Vol 1, No 1, 291–319
term “utility of life”, presuming thereby some higher values and probably 
best described as “meaning of life”, although meaning then tends to be 
reduced to utility in a more restricted sense. This utility is an objective 
state, recognizable by outsiders, and inner awareness is not a prerequisite. 
The “appreciation of life” is the fourth aspect where the outcome reached 
is via an inner assessment process, mostly described as “subjective well-
being”, “life satisfaction” or “happiness” (in the subjective, limited sense). 
This distinction by Veenhoven makes it possible to classify different 
disciplines’ interventions to increase happiness in terms of the sub-area 
of “quality of life” where they are focusing. For example, liveability of the 
environment could be observed under ecological measures like climate, air 
purity and spaciousness; social measures like political freedom; economic 
measures like a nation’s wealth, welfare system and income parity; or 
cultural measures like education, science and the state of the arts. Life-
ability of an individual can refer to physical and mental health, knowledge, 
skills and lifestyle. Utility of life can be observed from relational aspects like 
care for friends, leaving a legacy, and the living of values like compassion 
and creativity. Appreciation of life can mean general appraisals of one’s 
life on an emotional (mood) or cognitive (contentment) level, or specific 
appraisals of aspects of life like satisfaction with work, work-life balance, 
et cetera. 
Citing a well-known definition of happiness as “justified satisfaction with 
life”, Veenhoven sees the term “happiness” as covering all four of his 
described aspects of quality of life, as the subjective assessment should 
correspond with the objective conditions (whether external or internal) so 
that enjoyment of an otherwise “useless life” or the denial of or resignation 
towards abject conditions cannot per se be seen as happiness. Apparently, 
for Veenhoven, ignorance is not bliss. 
From the taxonomy, instruments for measuring “happiness” or “quality 
of life” can now be evaluated, or at least classified for their applicability. 
A medical quality of life assessment’s application (assessing among 
other factors physical limitations and pain levels) will be different from, 
say, a psychological assessment of “well-being” (measuring for example 
a combination of material well-being, health, productivity, intimacy, 
safety, social status and emotional well-being), a sociological assessment 
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of individual quality of life (looking for example at housing conditions, 
political participation, education and general life-satisfaction) and a socio-
economic assessment like the Human Development Index (which looks at 
material wealth, education level and life-expectancy). 
Veenhoven (2000, p. 32) concludes that quality of life cannot really be 
measured comprehensively as a sum-score of different sub-measures. 
“Chances” and “Outcomes” cannot be meaningfully added, for example, 
because abilities and environmental challenges need to match. It does 
not automatically make a person happy if he or she has certain capacities 
for which the environment has no use. “When human capacities fit 
environmental demands, there is a good chance that human needs are 
gratified. Only bad luck or wilful deprivation can block that outcome. 
Gratification of basic needs will manifest in a stream of pleasant 
experiences.” (Veenhoven, 2000, p. 33)
Determinants of happiness
The set point of happiness
One of the reasons happiness studies abound, is not only to understand the 
determinants of happiness out of mere curiosity, but to be able to intervene 
to raise the level of happiness in individuals’ lives and in societies as a 
whole, seeing that happiness has proven benefits (for example sociability, 
stronger immune systems, better self-esteem) (Caunt, et al., 2013, p. 476). 
The intriguing question is how much of one’s personal happiness is under 
your control, and therefore susceptible to intervention. 
Caunt et al (2013, p. 477) use Seligman’s formula which accounts for stable 
and variable components of long-term happiness: H (enduring level of 
happiness) = S (personal set range) + C (circumstances) + V (factors under 
personal voluntary control), also called set-point, life circumstances, and 
intentional activity, respectively. This also defines major areas of research 
in happiness science, namely on how large the influence of the set-point 
(if there is such a level), specific life circumstances or specific behavioural 
or cognitive activities might be. The research cited by Caunt et al suggests 
an estimated 50% influence by the set-point (mostly personality traits like 
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high extraversion, low neuroticism, high optimism and high self-esteem)3, 
10% on circumstances and 40% on intentional activities.4 
The surprisingly low level of influence ascribed to circumstances (which 
include such factors as geography, age, gender and marriage) is regarded as 
due to the adaptive ability of humans. After being either much less or much 
more happy than usual due to changes in external circumstances, happiness 
levels tend to return to the set-point fairly quickly. Circumstances most 
constantly predicting higher subjective well-being are being married, being 
religious, being employed, being healthy and being sufficiently wealthy to 
meet basic needs (Caunt, et al., 2013, p. 478). 
The value of intervention
Intervention as suggested intentional activities could be divided in three 
types, namely behavioural, cognitive and volitional. Behaviourally, physical 
activities, meditation and mindfulness and social activities have been found 
to increase subjective well-being. Cognitive (attitudinal) activity increasing 
subjective well-being include practicing gratitude, forgiveness and coping 
cognitively with adversity. Volitional activities are about pursuing goals 
3 Studies revisited by Gomez et al (2009, pp. 345-346) have shown a clear role for 
personality as a stable factor on subjective well-being (up to 39% of the variance in 
subjective well-being can be ascribed to personality factors). “A strong relationship 
between neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness and all 
components of subjective well-being, whereas openness to experience shows close 
associations with the subjective well-being facets of happiness, positive affect, and 
quality of life” (Gomez, et al., 2009, p. 346). Especially extraversion (positive influence) 
and neuroticism (negative influence) stand out as personality factors influencing 
subjective well-being in individuals. Gomez et al found interesting age differences, 
namely that “extraversion is only a predictor of subjective well-being in young adults 
and the effect of neuroticism is more pronounced in old adults” (Gomez, et al., 2009, 
p. 345). . In terms of life events, the influence of negative life events on subjective well-
being is stronger in young and middle-aged adults as compared to old adults. Also 
the influence of negative life events is stronger that positive life events. Further, they 
found that individuals can adapt to one life event at a time: “it seems that individuals 
are able to manage one critical life event, but if they are faced with two or more critical 
life events within a five-year period their subjective well-being decreases importantly” 
(Gomez, et al., 2009, p. 346).
4 The 2007 statistical study by Lucas and Donnellan has shown that 34-38% of the 
variance in observed scores is trait variance that does not change, while an additional 
29-34% can be accounted for by an autoregressive trait that is only moderately stable 
over time. “Thus, although life satisfaction is moderately stable over long periods of 
time, there is also an appreciable degree of instability that might depend on contextual 
circumstances” (Lucas & Donnellan, 2007, p. 1091). 
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set according to one’s interests and values, and maintaining hope and 
construe meaning in life (Caunt, et al., 2013, pp. 478-480). Because positive 
social relationships (“stable connections with family, friends, partners, and 
community”) have been shown consistently to increase levels of subjective 
well-being, Caunt et al treat “Social Relationships” as a separate determinant 
category, instead of including it in the “Circumstances” category (Caunt, et 
al., 2013, p. 478). In their content analysis study, Caunt et al subsequently 
analyse the reports of people on their “recipes for long-term happiness”, 
according to the 4 categories and 19 elements identified from their literature 
study, in order to not only reconfirm the value of those determinants, but 
also to see whether previously undocumented determinants arise. These 
new elements was statistically isolated and shown to be education, safety 
and mental well-being as circumstances, and as new activities to enhance 
subjective well-being hobbies and interests, travel and holidays, relaxation, 
nature, humour and laughter and good food (behavioural activities) and 
having social values and a philosophy of life (cognitive activities) (Caunt, et 
al., 2013, p. 487). Based upon the literature study and their findings in the 
content analysis, Caunt et al conclude in terms of a “recipe for long-lasting 
happiness”:
Happy people are those who (1) are actively involved in a number of 
close relationships and practice their social values in these relations-
hips, (2) do not overrate the importance of circumstances or spend 
undue energy striving for circumstantial change, (3) enjoy satisfying 
and preferably active leisure pursuits, (4) actively and intelligently 
pursue (behavioural) activities and (cognitive) attitudes that are 
intrinsically rewarding and in line with their broader sense of pur-
pose, and (5) have a general philosophy of living that helps them to 
navigate life’s complexities.” (Caunt, et al., 2013, pp. 494-495)
These findings are consistent with earlier control studies, for example 
that of Warner and Vroman (2011). They re-test in their new study the 
strategies identified by Lyubomirsky in 2007 as proven to effectively 
increase happiness, namely “expressing gratitude; cultivating optimism; 
avoiding worry, social comparison and self-focused rumination; doing 
acts of kindness; nurturing social relationships; developing new coping 
strategies; learning to forgive; increasing flow experiences; savouring life’s 
joys; committing to goals; practicing religion or spirituality; and taking 
304 Van der Merwe  •  STJ 2015, Vol 1, No 1, 291–319
care of your body” (Warner & Vroman, 2011, p. 1065). They also utilize 
the personality traits proven to predict set levels of happiness, especially 
extraversion and neuroticism. This is particularly interesting as the 
personality traits also correlate with the frequency of utilizing many of the 
“happiness inducing behaviour”. 
Nurturing relationships, cultivating optimism, acts of kindness, savouring, 
and exercise was the happiness inducing behaviour most frequently 
engaged in, while forgiveness, trying to avoid worry, spiritual activities, and 
meditation was the least frequent (Warner & Vroman, 2011, p. 1076). Some 
gender differences were discovered, notably that women reported engaging 
in nurturing social relationships more often than men. The largest gender 
difference was found for “flow” (being so absorbed in a present activity that 
past and future gets blended out), with men reporting flow about 2-3 times 
per week, while women only about once per week. “The happiness inducing 
behaviour that had the largest correlations with happiness was cultivating 
optimism, savouring, and avoiding worry. Nurturing relationships, 
gratitude, and acts of kindness had smaller (but still statistically significant) 
associations with happiness” (Warner & Vroman, 2011, p. 1077).
Positive interventions can indeed be effective. For example, well-being has 
been improved and depression decreased in a study where nine activities or 
“happiness exercises” were performed and tested in terms of their shorter 
and longer term influence on happiness levels (Gander, et al., 2013).5 “All 
5 The activities were:
i) Gratitude visit (Participants were instructed to write and deliver a letter of gratitude 
to a person they were grateful to, but whom they had never thanked appropriately)
ii) Three good things (Participants were instructed to write down three things that 
had gone well for them and an explanation why those things happened)
iii) Using signature strengths in a new way (Participants in this group received 
individualized feedback on their top five character strengths and were instructed to use 
one of their top five strengths in a new way)
iv) Three funny things (Participants were instructed to write down the three funniest 
things they experienced or did and an explanation why those things happened to them) 
v) Counting kindness (Participants were instructed to count and report the acts of 
kindness they performed)
vi) Gift of time (Participants were instructed to offer at least three ‘‘gifts of time’’ by 
contacting/meeting three persons about whom they care in a week)
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the presented interventions (except for three good things in 2 weeks) were 
associated with an increase in happiness and a decrease in depressive 
symptoms in comparison with the baseline (Gander, et al., 2013, p. 1254)
Interestingly enough, the interventions differed in their effect. The three 
funny things exercise were more powerful in its anti-depressant effect 
and also seemed to have a more immediate and intense effect of positive 
emotions, while the three good things intervention had a longer term 
and more cognitive effect. As for the reasons for the positive effect of the 
interventions, it is thought that the increased positive emotions build 
enduring personal resources. But more importantly, it seemed to increase 
mindfulness (being attentive to the moment) and self-regulation (the 
experience of self-determination).
Positive psychology had a large impact on recent theories of intervention 
seeking increased well-being in individuals. The use of “strengths 
classifications”, notably “StrengthsFinder” and the “VIA (Values In 
Action)” inventory of character strengths use workplace talents (to 
support personal development and success at work) and universally valued 
character traits respectively. The premise is that working on one’s strengths 
rather than one’s weaknesses produces greater benefits for the individual. 
In the study by Quinlan et al (Quinlan, et al., 2012) the benefit of strengths-
based interventions for increased well-being have been confirmed on the 
basis that the “use of one’s strengths is engaging and fulfilling; therefore, 
development of an individual’s top strengths should lead to increased 
engagement and achievement and so enhance well-being” (Quinlan, et al., 
2012, p. 1147). However, working concurrently on weaknesses was shown 
beneficial as well, especially for women. The authors emphasized setting 
goals in strength-based interventions.6 
vi) One door closes, another door opens (Participants were instructed to write about 
a moment in their lives when a negative event led to unforeseen positive consequences) 
vii) Early memories (Participants were instructed to write down something from their 
early memories) (Gander, et al., 2013, p. 1244)
6 As to which strengths relates to subjective well-being (suggesting that the development 
of those strengths may also increase subjective well-being), the study of Proyer et al 
(Proyer, et al., 2013) showed, firstly that any strengths-based intervention does enhance 
well-being (compared to the control group). The study based its interventions upon the 
2004 research by Park, which has shown that the (VIA) strengths of curiosity, gratitude, 
hope, love, and zest correlates the strongest to subjective well-being.
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Income and happiness
The relationship between income and happiness has been studied 
extensively in different disciplines, notably in psychology and economics. 
One of the most controversial contributions to the sub-discipline of 
“happiness economics” has been an article by Richard Easterlin (1974) 
where he describes what since have been known as the “Easterlin paradox”. 
A clear connection between income and life satisfaction was found on an 
individual level (Easterlin’s data clearly showed that within countries the 
highest income status group also reported the highest happiness or life 
satisfaction). When national comparisons were made, however, happiness 
differences between richer and poorer countries were not clear from 
the data, as one would have expected on the basis of the within-country 
comparisons (Easterlin, 1974, p. 30). Easterlin’s explanation has to do with 
comparison levels. The within country difference (it seems to be a question 
of proximity) has a larger effect than comparisons further away. What 
constitutes happiness seems to be the relative gap between current living 
levels and “the social norm”. The results also attest to the adaptability of 
humankind and how happiness levels are a relative and not an absolute 
figure. Since Easterlin’s original research was published, there has also been 
deeper analysis suggesting a “satiation point” beyond which further rise in 
income does not correspond to an equal rise in happiness levels. $7 500 
(Inglehart & Klingemann in (NG, 2008, p. 259) and $12 000 (Kahneman, 
et al., 2006, p. 1909) have been offered as yearly per capita income levels 
beyond which the relationship of income to happiness becomes weak 
or non-existent. The premise is that once basic needs are fulfilled, more 
income does not substantially raise happiness level (a view consistent with 
classical needs models, like that of Maslow, which emphasises the role of 
social belonging and self-actualization beyond basic subsistence and safety 
levels. 
The Easterlin paradox’s appeal lay in the ideological concerns over a 
capitalistic market economy’s negative consequences, notably concern 
over sustainability and inequality. “Money isn’t everything,” was the adage 
supported by the Easterlin paradox. However, the “Easterlin paradox” has 
also been criticized often, notably for its statistical analysis, and also for the 
“basket of countries” which data it relied on. Concluding that it is rather 
the “Easterlin illusion” and that “Happiness isn’t everything” (Veenhoven 
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& Vergunst, 2013, pp. 18-19) should be welcomed as a necessary correction 
and voice of reason against underemphasizing the role of economic 
development for better societal living conditions, but should not silence 
the other voices of reason (equally well supported by research) that there 
are many determinants of well-being, and that economic factors (although 
more important in terms of happiness for the poor than for the rich) should 
not be over-emphasized as determinant of well-being. “Money can buy 
happiness, but only some” is the more nuanced conclusion by Luhmann et 
al (2011, p. 186) after their statistical study. They confirm the paradox that, 
although economic theory predicts more choices to become available when 
people have more disposable income and that would have to increase their 
happiness, correlation between income and subjective well-being remains 
low (0.18 in the World Values Survey, for example). They also confirm the 
non-linear shape of the relationship, according to the law of diminishing 
marginal utility and the consequence that the association between income 
and subjective well-being is larger with people in low-income categories and 
smaller in high-income categories. The same was found by the quoted 2008 
study of Howell & Howell that correlation is 0.28 in low-income developing 
countries, and only 0.13 in high-income developing countries (Luhmann, 
et al., 2011, p. 186). They go deeper into the factors influencing happiness 
(both cognitive well-being and affective well-being) and find that stable 
factors (like personality traits) have a stronger correlation with income. 
It can be said that richer people is in general more satisfied than poorer 
people, due to stable factors which may be the cause of the higher income, 
instead of the other way round. They therefore ask for more research to be 
done on the influence of personality on the ability to generate income. 
The main problem (Diener & Seligman, 2004) is that policymakers still 
tend to rely on pure economic indicators, most often aggregate indicators 
like Gross Domestic Product, which neglects firstly the inequality 
within nations, and secondly ignores the determinants of well-being 
for individuals, and for nations collectively. For example, comparison 
between Gross Domestic Product and life satisfaction indicators in the 
USA showed that although Gross Domestic Product has tripled in 50 
years, life satisfaction levels remained flat (Japan and some other countries 
have similar patterns). The reason most often given for the flat trend of 
life satisfaction in the wake of income increase is that desires grow with 
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increased income, so that the gap between desire and income remains 
wide (this is also known as the “hedonic treadmill”7). Individuals can even 
experience decreasing happiness levels when aspirations grow quicker than 
the capacity to fulfil them. 
Diener and Seligman (2004, p. 24) do not propose well-being indicators to 
replace economic indicators. Their approach is “beyond money” and not 
“instead of money”. Insight is indeed needed in the benefits of measuring 
and promoting well-being, instead of thinking of economic growth as 
the be all and end all of national goals, hoping that through some sort of 
trickle-down effect everybody will be happy in the end. Rather, even though 
mediated and delayed, the advantages of increased well-being should 
be clearly recognized, including proneness to democratic government, 
higher income (yes, it also works the other way round with happier people 
eventually earning more), self-motivated and productive workers, physical 
and mentally healthier individuals and better social relationships (thus 
more stable and engaged communities) 
Taking both the macro- and micro-economic perspectives into account, the 
common denominator remains that the greater the inequality of income 
distribution in a society or country, the higher the levels of dissatisfaction 
and alienation (Porritt, 2007, p. 63). As mentioned previously, this is due to 
the fact that contentment is not a matter of absolute but of relative wealth. 
The comparison gap influences the level of discontent. Recognizing in 
agreement with Layard that happiness depends as much on our inner lives 
and our social relationships than on our outer circumstances, Porritt also 
pleads for policy-making to attend more to qualitative improvements in 
society than mere quantitative improvements (economic growth, or “the 
limitless transformation of natural capital into man-made capital” (Porritt, 
2007, p. 70). The problem he sees with using Gross Domestic Product as a 
measure of wealth of a country, is that it is an aggregate figure, measuring 
the flow of imports and exports and government expenditure, but not 
heeding the inequality of per capita income, the living circumstances 
7 “Hedonic adaptation is a process by which the cognitive effects of a repeated experience 
(for instance, consumption) are reduced. A hedonic treadmill results when the 
adaptation occurs to the point where the experience is rendered neutral in its effect on 
well-being” (Keely, 2005, p. 335).
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of people and the externalised costs for the natural capital transformed 
into products, endangering the longer term sustainability of the growth 
trajectory. The Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare, the Human 
Development Index, Happy Planet Index and Gross National Happiness are 
some of the alternative indexes proposed to include forms of measurements 
of well-being beyond economic growth. Needed is a “shift of emphasis 
from a ‘production-oriented’ measurement system to one focused on the 
well-being of current and future generations, i.e. toward broader measures 
of social progress” (Stiglitz, et al., n.d., p. 10).
So, if money cannot buy happiness, why do we still act as if it does? It is not 
because people are just uninformed (and in some deluded way believe that 
money will make them happy). It is rather that they are motivated by more 
factors than just the pursuit of happiness (Ahuvia, 2008, p. 491). Clearly 
people do not change their consumerist behaviour just because they are 
told “more stuff won’t make you happier”. Ahuvia postulates that subjective 
well-being is not the only value that people strive to maximize8, that people 
make decisions favouring short-term gain and instant gratification and 
that “our behaviour reflects evolutionary motivational systems that aren’t 
always in sync with our values. Specifically, people use consumption not 
just to be happy, but to manage their identity and social relationships” 
(Ahuvia, 2008, p. 504).
Relationships and happiness
Well-being also depends on the way in which the basic human needs to 
belong and to have close and long-term stable relationships are met (Diener 
& Seligman, 2004, p. 18). High income can in fact lead to isolation and 
decreased appreciation for the value of social relationships. Therefore 
economic indicators do not correlate well with social indicators, and 
economic policy-makers may tend to ignore this very important aspect, 
although it has a large effect on increasing well-being, which in turn leads 
to better productivity levels. This effect is too mediated and delayed for 
policy-makers to take it seriously. 
8 There are others values people aspire to, for example power, achievement, hedonism, 
stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity and 
security (Ahuvia, 2008, p. 497).
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In an interesting cross-cultural study on “Visualizing the good life” (Bonn 
& Tafarodi, 2013) the authors examined people’s beliefs on what makes 
for a “good life”. They re-confirmed “being connected to other people in 
desirable ways is of primary importance for all the groups”. Close and 
enduring relationships such as having close friends, having a good marriage 
or romantic partnership and having a happy family are universally thought 
of as constituting a satisfying, good, or worthy life. 
Although many studies support the idea that married people are happier 
than unmarried people, this has always been one of the most controversial 
determinants of happiness. There are plausible reasons for marriage to 
enhance well-being, for example that marriage provides additional sources 
of self-esteem. Also, married people have a better chance of benefiting 
from a lasting and supportive intimate relationship, and suffer less from 
loneliness (Stutzer & Frey, 2006, p. 328). This evidence and explanations, 
however, are countered by the question whether marriage creates happiness, 
or whether it is the other way round, that happiness promotes marriage. 
Indeed, Stutzer and Frey (2006, p. 329) have found a selection process at 
work. Happier singles are more likely to opt for marriage. And “people who 
get divorced were not only less happy during marriage but also less happy 
before they got married” (Stutzer & Frey, 2006, p. 342). The selection effect 
is, however, only one part of the explanation for the evidence that married 
people are happier. Together with the said reasons, the authors also found 
that “potential, as well as actual, division of labour seems to contribute to 
spouses’ well-being, especially for women and when there is a young family 
to raise. In contrast, large differences in the partners’ educational level have 
a negative effect on experienced life satisfaction” (Stutzer & Frey, 2006, p. 
326).
A South African study (Botha & Booysen, 2013) tested the role of 
institutionalization as a determinant of well-being in married and 
cohabiting couples, especially as South Africa is currently not as secularized 
as many other parts of the world. Institutionalization is supposed to bring 
more certainty of the sustainability of the relationship and more social 
approval, thereby enhancing well-being. They do find significantly higher 
satisfaction levels among married individuals, but when factors like 
religiosity, income, education and health are accounted for, the satisfaction 
levels are more alike. 
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Work and family are the two life domains where basic life needs can be 
fulfilled. However, when incompatibility or role conflict between work 
and family arise, individuals are less likely to experience life satisfaction. 
On the other hand, the two domains can also be mutually beneficial 
and in their synergy enhance an individual’s well-being. In their 7 year 
longitudinal study of MBA students, Masuda and Sortheix have found that 
giving priority to family goals over work and leisure goals lead to higher 
life satisfaction after 7 years from reporting such goals. Additionally, this 
effect was mediated by family satisfaction. Interestingly enough, they 
additionally found that family priority goals led to higher life satisfaction 
when those families also have a strong set of core family values (Masuda & 
Sortheix, 2012, p. 1131).
Phase of life and happiness
Blanchflower & Oswald (2008, pp. 1733-1734), in their overview over studies 
concerning the relation between well-being and age, found the classical 
stance that the happiness curve tend to remain flat, or slightly rising in 
age, to be countered by numerous studies which suggest and have proven 
a U-shaped curve. Their statistical analysis of several datasets confirms 
these results and shows the highest probability for “mental distress” in 
middle age (Blanchflower & Oswald, 2008, p. 1746). Their result covers 72 
countries’ data spanning several decades, and show that this U-shape of 
happiness is robust, showing up consistently in the different countries and 
for both genders. The authors suggest that it may be due to the possibility 
that “individuals learn to adapt to their strengths and weaknesses, and 
in mid-life quell their infeasible aspirations” (Blanchflower & Oswald, 
2008, p. 1747). Other suggestions are that cheerful people live longer and 
that there is a selection effect at work in the U-shape. In later age more 
gratefulness can also set in, as one sees peers die and value the blessings in 
the remaining years. 
There are, however, conflicting reports, even showing a slight inverse 
U-shape, implying that people are at their most satisfied in middle-age 
(Easterlin, 2006). The trend then rises slightly from age 18 onwards, and 
declines slowly after middle-age. The contradicting studies seem to be 
the result of definition problems, and which composition of indicators 
the measurement of well-being consists of. The U-shape is measuring 
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subjective well-being, while Easterlin’s study includes a composite of 
objective (circumstantial) and subjective measurements. This creates an 
effect where trends offset each other. For example, somebody may feel 
accomplished and content in old age, but deteriorating health offsets that. 
Family life, financial situation, work and health, are the four domains 
Easterlin includes in his assessment. Negative impacts of other areas, were 
offset by the increasing satisfaction in the domain of financial situation 
with age. In all of the domains, the levels of satisfaction depend on the 
perceived fulfilment of goals and expectations, and less on the objective 
and absolute circumstances, as many economic models would contend.
In the study by Burr et al (2011) higher “positive affect” (happiness or 
satisfaction) was reported in retired individuals by females as well as 
those with better finances, fewer illnesses, and higher self-transcendence, 
openness to change and conservation values.9 The impact of finances on 
affect was stable over time, but the effects of health and values increased 
across the 3 years studied by the authors. One possible explanation for 
the increased effects of values and health is that “values and health status 
manifest in patterns of activity and social engagement that may have 
accumulating benefits or deficits. For example, being concerned with 
helping others may result in reciprocated help that returns to the individual 
over time; placing high importance on status and wealth may lead to 
goal frustration, an effect that compounds over time; being creative and 
interested in seeking new experiences and pleasure may aid in establishing 
healthy activity patterns in retirement that promote positive experiences 
and prevent negative ones; and finally, having illnesses may result in 
activity restriction and social disengagement, the negative effects of which 
may multiply as years go by” (Burr, et al., 2011, p. 35).
9 “Conservation values are related to the pursuit of conformity to social norms, 
upholding tradition and customs, and maintaining security of the individual person 
and of society. Conservation values have been found to be higher among older adults, 
suggesting they have increasing importance across the lifespan. Among younger adults 
they are associated with lower affective well-being and guilt-proneness. In contrast, 
among retirees conservation values may be linked to enhanced affective well-being 
through their emphasis on tradition or religion which may provide retirees with 
social connectedness, purpose, and meaning, as well as through their emphasis on 
maintaining health. As such, conservation values are also consistent with emotionally-
meaningful present-oriented goals.” (Burr, et al., 2011, p. 21)
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Geography and happiness
Brereton et al (2008) were able to show the impact of geographical factors 
on subjective well-being. Isolating data according to GIS classifications, 
the authors found “that climate has a significant influence on well-being, 
with wind speed negative and significant, but increases in both January 
minimum temperature and July maximum temperature are positive and 
significant. Access to major transport routes and proximity to coast and 
to waste facilities all influence well-being. However, the manner in which 
they enter the happiness equation differs depending on the amenity in 
question. Proximity to landfill is found to have a negative effect on well-
being. Proximity to the coast has a large positive effect, but its influence is 
a diminishing function of distance. Additionally, the impact of proximity 
to major transport routes has different effects depending on the type of 
and distance to the amenity in question, for example while reasonable 
proximity to international airports increases well-being, close proximity 
to major roads decreases it. It may be that, in the former case, the positive 
effect of access outweighs the negative effect of noise, while the opposite 
may be true in the latter case.” (Brereton, et al., 2008, pp. 394-395)
Religion and happiness
When religion is not only seen from a dogmatic perspective, but from the 
viewpoint of worldview, values, meaning of life, et cetera the influence of 
religion on well-being becomes clear:
“People’s immediate reactions to events will be influenced by their 
worldview and the way they understand the world. Since this is a 
primary function of religion (providing meaning to events), it is 
reasonable to think that religious beliefs will have an effect on im-
mediate understanding and responses to events” (Wiegand & Weiss, 
2006, pp. 37-38).
Beyond the adherence to religious observances Swinyard et al (2001, p. 
18) include the aspect of religion as “quest”. This is about “facing complex, 
existential questions (of life’s meaning, of death, of relations with others) 
and resisting clear-cut, oversimplified answers. An individual who 
approaches religion in this way recognizes that he or she does not know, 
and probably never will know, the final truth about such matters. Three 
aspects are included in this dimension: (1) readiness to face existential 
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questions without reducing their complexity, (2) seeing self-criticism and 
perception of religious doubts as positive, and (3) openness to change.” 
They hypothesized that religion, as quest would correlate negatively 
to life satisfaction, as it is commonly associated with more uncertainty, 
complexity, worry and guilt. However, positive correlation was found. The 
positive influences can lie in valuing one’s doubts and asking questions 
about the meaning of life. It may also be possible that “happy people simply 
have greater tolerance for ambiguity” (Swinyard, et al., 2001, p. 28).
The correlation between religiousness and happiness may also be ascribed 
to the security that certain dogmatic beliefs bring (for example the 
promise of immortality and the clear distinctions between good and evil). 
The social support (and perceived acceptance by and conformity to) the 
religious group may also play a strong part. Of course, it can also be shown 
that excessive religious fixation can also produce depression or mental 
disorders (Snoep, 2008, p. 208).
The important distinction between spirituality and religious adherence 
should be made. Studies suggest that the spirituality component is more 
conducive to well-being than religious adherence per se (Joshanloo, 2011, 
p. 915). It can be argued that religious adherence only produces well-being 
in as far as it is a conduit for spirituality (and the meaning or “spiritual 
intelligence” it mediates), or when it provides other proven determinants 
of subjective well-being, like enduring and satisfying social relationships. 
Conclusion: Entry points for theological engagement
Meaningful theological engagement in the happiness discourse is 
increasingly visible, for example in the 1996 work of Vincent Brümmer 
and Marcel Sarot (Happiness, Well-Being and the Meaning of Life: A 
Dialogue of Social Science and Religion), the work of Ellen Charry (like 
her God and the art of Happiness, 2011) and the collected theological 
essays edited by Brent Strawn (The Bible and the Pursuit of Happiness, 
2012). The purpose of this essay’s interpreted overview of trends in the 
study of happiness, especially as it emerges from experimental psychology, 
is to delineate areas where the voice of the Judeo-Christian tradition can be 
enlightening and provide much-needed worldview perspectives which may 
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move the discussion closer toward the seemingly ever-elusive integrated 
understanding of happiness. The following four entry points are suggested 
where theological engagement with the interdisciplinary discourse on 
happiness could be most fruitful:
1. The flourishing agent. In the Judeo-Christian tradition the Hebrew 
‘asrê and the Greek makarios is associated with happiness or blessing. 
The meaning links closely to what Raibley above described as 
“flourishing”. Probing the background and context of these terms in 
the Biblical texts from a Judeo-Christian anthropological perspective 
may shed some light on what it mean to flourish as a human being. 
2. Determinants for happiness. On each of the determinants of 
happiness, as explicated in this essay, the Judeo-Christian tradition 
has significant contributions to make in the interdisciplinary 
discourse. For example, the value of community, compassion and 
koinonia speak to the value of relationships in human flourishing. The 
value of income is placed in perspective by the theological discussion 
on materiality and consumerism. The value of geography links to the 
prominence of a “land theology” in the Old Testament, as well as the 
appreciation for the beauty (and conservation) of creation. Life phases 
are prominent in generational thinking in the Bible and in particular 
the affirmation of both youth and old age. 
3. Anamnesis and eschatology. “The invitation to ‘hope backward’ into 
the realm of memory and to ‘remember forward’ into the realm of 
hope” (Ford, 1982, p. 46) is the constant task of the chosen people 
of the Old Testament and the body of Christ in the New Testament. 
Linking to Durayappah’s model of temporal determinants of 
subjective well-being, theological engagement can be very significant. 
4. The quest for meaning. That which constitutes a meaningful life is 
core to Biblical theology. It is also closely related to the notion of 
“calling” and “mission”. A life given to that, which is larger than itself, 
which includes the notion of “sacrifice” and which can be modelled 
on the life of Jesus Christ are some of the themes where a theological 
contribution to the happiness discourse can be of value. 
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“Seek God, not happiness” said Dietrich Bonhoeffer. However, in the Judeo-
Christian worldview these two need not be mutually exclusive. “If you seek 
God alone, you will gain happiness: that is the promise” (Bonhoeffer, 1954, 
p. 84).
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